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I. INTRODUCTION

Few issues in recent state history have engendered the degree of
controversy and distaste among state residents as the 1994 legislative
pay raise. Soon after the passage of this legislation,' litigation was
initiated to challenge the constitutionality of the procedures utilized in
the introduction and eventual passage of the pay raise. A declaratory
judgment action was brought by Donna J. Boley, a state Senator from
Pleasant County, West Virginia, and Robert Pulliam, M.D., a member
of the House of Delegates from Raleigh County, West Virginia, in the
Circuit Court of Kanawha County.' The action alleged that the procedures employed by the legislature and the Citizens Legislative Compensation Commission3 in effecting the pay raise were unconstitutional
under West Virginia Constitution Article VI, Section Thirty-three. Upon the filing of this suit, Glen B. Gainer II, Auditor of the State of
West Virginia, informed the Clerk of the Senate and the Clerk of the
House of Delegates that he would not honor any invoices presented to
him for payment of legislative salaries or expenses under the authority
of House Bill 4031 until a final judicial determination of the bill's
constitutionality had been made.4 The Auditor's position prompted
Darrell E. Holmes, Clerk of the Senate, and Donald L. Kopp, Clerk of

1. W. VA. CODE §§ 4-2A-1 to -10 (1994 & Supp. 1994), as amended by H.B. 4031
(1994).
2. A complaint was filed by Donna J. Boley and Robert Pulliam, M.D., plaintiffs,
against Lanrie Bailey, Treasurer of West Virginia, which sought a declaratory judgment to

declare West Virginia Code Chapter 4, Article 2A, as amended by H.B. 4031 (1994), null
and void and to enjoin the Treasurer from disbursing any monies pursuant to the amended

statute. Complaint, State ex rel. Holmes v. Gainer, 447 S.E.2d 887 (W. Va. 1994) (No.
94/22226) [hereinafter Complaint].

3. The Citizens Legislative Compensation Commission is a seven-person entity created
under a 1970 amendment to W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 33; its purpose is to consider and

recommend compensation and expense allowance modifications for and to the state legislature. See infra text accompanying notes 48-52.

4. Letter from Glen B. Gainer II, Auditor of the State of W. Va., to Darrell E.
Holmes, Clerk of the West Virginia Senate, and Donald L. Kopp, Clerk of the W. Va.
House of Delegates (Apr. 4, 1994) (on file with author) [hereinafter Gainer Letter].
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the House of Delegates, to petition the Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia for a Writ of Mandamus compelling Auditor Gainer to
perform his constitutional duty to issue warrants for payment of legislative salaries and expenses in accordance with House Bill 4031.V The
Clerks also asked that the Supreme Court issue a Writ of Prohibition
prohibiting Judge Herman Canady of the Kanawha County Circuit
Court from hearing the declaratory judgment action filed in that court.6
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held by a 3-2
majority in State ex rel. Holmes v. Gainer' that the Clerks should be
granted the requested Writs of Mandamus and Prohibition. Justice
Miller's majority opinion concluded that although West Virginia Constitution Article VI, Section Thirty-three allowed the Citizens Legislative Compensation Commission to meet as often as necessary, it prohibited the Commission from submitting resolutions on legislative compensation and expense allowances specifically in the 1994 legislative
session.' The opinion held that this Commission could submit resolutions for compensation only on a quadrennial basis calculated from the
1971 legislative session, thereby precluding submission of such a resolution in the 1994 legislative session.' However, the majority, after
reviewing principles for determining retroactivity of judicial opinions,
held that the 1994 legislative compensation and expense allowances
contained in House Bill 4031 were not invalid."0 This Comment examines the decision of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
in State ex rel. Holmes v. Gainer' and explores the possible consequences of what the court said in its opinion, as well as what the court
failed to address.

5. See Memorandum of Law for Petitioners from Darrell E. Holmes, Clerk of the W.
Va. Senate, and Donald L. Kopp, Clerk of the W. Va. House of Delegates, at 1-2, State ex
rel. Holmes v. Gainer, 447 S.E.2d 887 (W. Va. 1994) (No. 94/22226) [hereinafter Petitio-

ners' Memorandum].
6.
7.
8.
9.

Id. at 2.
447 S.E.2d 887, 896 (W. Va. 1994).
Id. at 888, Syl. Pt. 3.
Id.

10. Id. at 889, Syl. Pt. 5.
11.

447 S.E.2d 887 (W. Va. 1994).
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Part Two of this Comment provides the factual background and
procedural posture of the case. This part will begin to lay a framework
that suggests the court allowed discovery in this case in violation of
the Speech o:r Debate Clauses of the Constitutions of both the State of
West Virginia12 and the United States. 3 These violations of the federal and state Speech or Debate Clauses were not addressed by the
court in the majority or dissenting opinions.
Part Three examines the background of three separate issues: (1)
the state constitutional provision concerning the formation of the Citizens Legislative Compensation Commission to bring resolutions concerning legislative compensation and expense allowances; 4 (2) a synopsis of general principles for determining retroactivity of judicial decisions in West Virginia; and (3) a background of the Speech or Debate
Clause of the state and federal constitutions. Part Four explains the
rationale of the majority and of the two very different dissenting
views. 5 Part Five concludes that the court's reasoning that the pay
raise was passed unconstitutionally rests on solid ground, but the
majority's analysis in failing to make this decision retroactive was
flawed. Additionally, Part Five analyzes the distressing manner in
which the court permitted discovery which violated the Speech or Debate Clauses of the state and federal constitutions as well as the doctrine of separation of powers inherent in the constitutional system. The
possibility of judicial intrusion into the legislative sphere and future
implications of such intrusion is also discussed. Accordingly, this Comment outlines what the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
should have done differently in its decision of this case.
II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case focuses on the constitutionality of the pay raise which
was initiated by resolution of the Citizens Legislative Compensation
12. W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 17.

13. U.S. ComsT. art. I, § 6.
14. W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 33.
15. Justice Miller delivered the opinion of the court, joined by Justice Workman and
Justice McHugh. Holmes, 447 S.E.2d at 889. Chief Justice Brotherton and Justice Neely
filed separate dissenting opinions. Id. at 896-901.
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Commission and which was passed by the West Virginia Legislature. 16
On March 3, 1994, the Commission convened and adopted a resolution
containing its recommendations with respect to compensation and expense allowances." In this resolution, the Commission recommended
that each member of the legislature receive compensation in the sum of
twenty thousand dollars per year for service in either house of the
legislature. 8 Other recommendations were made concerning expenses
incurred by, and additional services performed by, legislators.' 9 The
resolution was signed by six of the seven members of the Commission."0 During the legislative session at the time the resolution was
submitted, the legislature incorporated a modified version of the resolution into House Bill 4031, which increased the yearly compensation for
legislators to only fifteen thousand dollars per year and provided for
various types of expense allowances.Y Additionally, this bill included
pay increases for other state officials and all state judges.22 Governor
Gaston Caperton signed House Bill 4031 into law on March 19,
1994.23
Four days later, on March 23, 1994, Senator Donna J. Boley and
Delegate Robert Pulliam, M.D., filed a declaratory judgment action in
the Kanawha County Circuit Court seeking to have the pay raise law
declared void because of its unconstitutionality; requesting a temporary
injunction prohibiting Treasurer Larrie Bailey from making any disbursements pursuant to this legislation; and asking for a permanent
injunction prohibiting any such payments in the future.24 The suit was
assigned to Judge Herman Canady. Upon being informed of the constitutional challenge of the pay raise, Glen B. Gainer Ill, State Auditor,

16. Citizens Legis. Compensation Comm. Res. (1994) (enacted).

17. Id. at 1.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1-5.
20. Id. at 7-8. The members of the Commission who signed the resolution were James
M. Brown, Chairman, Linda D. Fluharty, Janet L. Nabors, Milan Puskar, Neal W. Scaggs,
and Anthony Yanero. Commission member Fred Haddad did not sign the resolution.
21. W. VA. CODE §§ 4-2A-1 to -10 (1994 & Supp. 1994), as amended by U-B. 4031
(1994).
22. Id.
23. Petitioners' Memorandum, supra note 5, at 2.
24. See Complaint, supra note 2.
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informed Darrell E. Holmes, Clerk of the West Virginia Senate, and
Donald L. Kopp, Clerk of the West Virginia House of Delegates, by
letter dated April 4, 1994, that he would not honor payment for any
legislative salaries or expenses pursuant to enacted House Bill 4031
until the bill's constitutionality had been judicially determined.'
At this point, Holmes and Kopp, the Clerks of the respective houses of the legislature, petitioned the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia26 for a Writ of Mandamus compelling Auditor Gainer to honor legislative pay and expense vouchers pursuant to enacted House Bill
4031 and for a Writ of Prohibition to prohibit Judge Herman Canady
from hearing the declaratory judgment action filed by Senator Boley
and Delegate Pulliam.
On April 12, 1994, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia issued a Rule to Show Cause, requiring Auditor Gainer, the respondent, to show cause why the Writ of Mandamus should not be awarded
by the court." The court ordered on April 20, 1994, that Senator
Boley and Delegate Pulliam be allowed to intervene in the action. 8
On April 22, 1994, Intervenors Boley and Pulliam filed a Supplemental
Motion for Discovery in which they asked the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia to allow them to depose nine individuals: Petitioners, Donald L. Kopp and Darrell Holmes; State Senators James
Humphreys, William R. Sharp, and William R. Wooton; and four
members of the Citizens Legislative Compensation Commission, James
Brown, Anthony Yanero, Linda Fluharty, and Janet Nabors." Additionally, the Intervenors asked the court's permission to issue a subpoena duces tecum to Governor Caperton's office requesting records of
any meetings held between the governor and Senators Wooton and

25. Gainer Lter, supra note 4.
26. Petitioners' Memorandum, supra note 5, at 1.

27. Supplemental Memorandum of Law for Petitioners at 3, State ex rel. Holmes v.
Gainer, 447 S.E.2d 887 (W. Va. 1994) (No. 94/22226) [hereinafter Supplemental Memoran-

dum of Law].
28. Id.
29. Id. at 19.
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Sharp between the dates of January 15, 1994, and March 3, 1994.30
The court granted this motion on April 22, 1994.3'
Relators Kopp and Holmes moved the court on April 26, 1994, to
require the Intervenors to identify the genuine issues of material fact
upon which they sought discovery. The Relators argued that the
Intervenors' responsive pleading to the Petition for Writ of Mandamus
admitted the material factual allegations set forth in the Petition and
only denied the Relators' legal conclusions as to the constitutionality of
enacted House Bill 403 1.3'2 Thus, the Relators argued that discovery
was not necessary and that such inquiry into legislative and committee
functions in the passage of the bill in question was violative of the
doctrine of separation of powers between governmental branches and of
3
33
the Speech or Debate Clause of the West Virginia Constitution.
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia rejected the Relators'
arguments and denied this motion.3 ' The Intervenors undertook discovery beginning on April 28, 1994.36 Counsel for the Intervenors deposed seven of the nine designated individuals.37
Thus, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia was faced
with the determination of the constitutionality of enacted House Bill
4031. Within this central theme, three distinct sub-issues were present:
(1) did the explicit language of the West Virginia Constitution invali3
date the legislative pay raise provisions of enacted House Bill 403 1; 1
(2) were communications between members of the legislature and
members of the Citizens Legislative Compensation Commission improper, and if so, did this impropriety invalidate the legislative pay
raise provisions of enacted House Bill 403 1,3' and (3) should the
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Supplemental Memorandum of Law, supra note 27, at 19-20.
33. W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 17.
34. Supplemental Memorandum of Law, supra note 27, at 20.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. Senator Sharp and Commission member Nabors were never deposed without
explanation.
38. See Brief of the Intervenors at 10, State ex rel. Holmes v. Gainer, 447 S.E.2d 887
(W. Va. 1994) (No. 94/22226) [hereinafter Brief of the Intervenors].

39. Id.
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court strike the discovery conducted by the Intervenors as violative of
the Speech or Debate Clause of the West Virginia Constitution and as
contrary to the doctrine of separation of powers between governmental
branches?4"
III. BACKGROUND OF THE LAW

In assessing whether or not the passage of House Bill 4031 was
constitutional, the Holmes court considered West Virginia Constitution
Article Six, Section Thirty-three which had never been interpreted by
the court. In doing so, however, the Holmes court virtually ignored the
Speech or Debate Clause of the West Virginia Constitution4 by allowing the Intervenors to depose several legislators.
A.

The ConstitutionalProceduresfor Enacting a Legislative Pay Raise

The amendment to Article Six, Section Thirty-three of the West
Virginia Constitution, creating the Citizens Legislative Compensation
Commission (the Commission), was proposed by House Joint Resolution Number Eight in 1970 and submitted to the voters in the November general election of that same year.42 The voters of the state approved this constitutional amendment on November 8, 1970."3 This
new provision created a seven-member commission for the express
purpose of considering and recommending compensation and expense
allowance modifications to the state legislature.4 This amendment was
designated the "Legislative Improvement Amendment," and provides, in
pertinent part, that:
Members of the legislature shall receive such compensation in connection

with the performance of their respective duties as members of
ture and such allowances for travel and other expenses in
therewith as shall be (1) established in a resolution submitted
islature by the citizens legislative compensation commission
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

the legislaconnection
to the leghereinafter

Supplemental Memorandum of Law, supra note 27, at 18-20.
W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 17.
Brief of the Intervenors, supra note 38, at 1.
Id.
Id.
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created, and (2) thereafter enacted into general law by the legislature at a
regular session thereof, subject to such requirements and conditions as
shall be prescribed in such general law. The legislature may in any such
general law reduce but shall not increase any item of compensation or
expense allowance established in such resolution. All voting on the floor
of both houses on the question of passage of any such general law shall
be by yeas and nays to be entered on the journals....
The commission shall meet as often as may be necessary and shall
within fifteen days after the beginning of the regular session of the legislature in the year [1971] and within fifteen days after the beginning of the
regular session in each fourth year thereafter submit by resolution to the
legislature its determination of compensation and expense allowances,
which resolution must be concurred in by at least four members of the
commission."

Soon after ratification by the voters, then Governor Arch A.
Moore, Jr. appointed the original seven members to serve upon the

Commission.46 On February 1, 1971, the Commission introduced its
first resolution to the Senate. Similar resolutions were introduced in the
years 1975, 1979, and 1983.' 7

Intervenors Boley and Pulliam challenged the constitutionality of
House Bill 4031 in their original Complaint to the Kanawha County
Circuit Court as being constitutionally defective in four ways.4 8 First,
they alleged that the Commission submitted its resolution to the legis-

lature on the fifty-first day of the session rather than within the first
fifteen days of the session as required by the ratified Legislative Improvement Amendment.49 Second, Intervenors Boley and Pulliam alleged that the provisions of the ratified amendment precluded the

Commission from submitting a compensation and expense resolution in
the year of 1994."0 Third, the Intervenors alleged that the decision to

submit the resolution to the legislature was not done in an independent

manner "without the inherent political pressures or influence that may
45. W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 33.

46. Brief of the Intervenors, supra note 38, at 1.
47. Id.at 2.
48. Complaint, supra note 2, at 3-4.
49. Id.at 3.
50. Id. Under this interpretation of the provision, years 1971, 1975, 1979, 1983, 1987,
1991, and 1995, and every fourth year thereafter, were permissible years for submission of a
compensation and expense allowance resolution to the legislature.
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be associated with the [legislature."' Finally, the Intervenors alleged
that the manner in which the resolution was passed in the legislature
violated the requirement that such a resolution be enacted into general
law by a "yea" or "nay" recorded floor vote by both houses. Instead,
the Intervenors alleged that the resolution was merely "incorporated as
a Committee substitute for H.B. 4031, an existing bill unrelated to
legislative compensation and expense reimbursements."52
Although the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia had not
yet had the opportunity to interpret the somewhat confusing language
of the Legislative Improvement Amendment as ratified, two separate
state attorney generals spoke to the issue concerning the frequency with
which the Commission was constitutionally permitted to meet and submit resolutions for compensation and expense allowances. In 1977, Attorney General Chauncey Browning issued a formal opinion and stated:
[I]t is the opinion of this office that the provision [Article Six, Section 33
of the Constitution] in no way restricts the Commission in presenting such
a resolution more often than every four years after the year 1971. Otherwise, there would be no need for the above provision requiring the Commission to meet as often as may be necessary. What purpose would be
served for the Commission to have meetings "as often as may be necessary" when3 it could take no action in accordance with the constitutional
provisions
On March 9, 1994, current Attorney General Darrell V. McGraw,
Jr., had the opportunity to revisit this question in an advisory letter to
Keith Burdette, President of the West Virginia Senate; concurred with
the previous interpretation; and opined that "no limiting language or
provisos bar presentation of a resolution on a more frequent basis [than
quadrennially]." '54 Additionally, Attorney General McGraw quoted
State ex rel. Barker v. Manchin" in concluding that the purpose of
the provision was to "'breathe due process into the establishment of
51. Id.

52. Id. at 4.
53. 57 Op. Att'y Gen. 115, 116 (1977).
54. Letter from Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., Attorney General of the State of W. Va., by
Jacquelyn I. Custer, Assistant Attorney General, to Keith Burdette, President of the W. Va.
Senate 1-2 (Mar. 9, 1994) (on file with author) [hereinafter McGraw Letter I].
55. 279 S.E.2d 622 (W. Va. 1981).
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fair and proper legislative salaries."' 56 In a second advisory letter on
March 10, 1994, Attorney General McGraw interpreted the provision
requiring the Commission to submit its resolution to the legislature
within fifteen days of the legislative session as "nonrestrictive" and,
therefore, applied only when the Commission met in the required
fourth year. 7 Thus, according to McGraw, the fifteen-day requirement
did not apply in the 1994 legislative session."8 The Holmes court
would reach a different conclusion than the two attorney generals regarding the interpretation of the amendment's confusing language about
the frequency of resolution submissions.
B. Retroactivity of JudicialDecisions in West Virginia
In Holmes, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia decided that its holding would not have retroactive effect based on certain
principles the court follows in determining whether a judicial decision
will have full retroactive effect. These principles were set forth in
Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co. 9 In Bradley, the court espoused
six factors the court considers when deciding whether full retroactivity
is appropriate in a given situation.60 First, the court must determine
the "nature of the substantive issue overruled."6 Retroactivity is less
appropriate when the overruled issue involves a traditionally settled
area of law than when such overruled issue is clearly foreshadowed.62
A second factor the court considers is whether the overruled decision is
primarily procedural in nature rather than substantive.63 Retroactivity
is more readily accorded to procedural decisions rather than substantive

56. McGraw Letter I, supra note 54, at 2 (quoting State ex rel. Barker v. Manchin,
279 S.E.2d 622 (W. Va. 1981)).

57. Letter from Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., Attorney General of the State of W. Va., by
Jacquelyn I. Custer, Assistant Attorney General, to Keith Burdette, President of the W. Va.

Senate 2 (Mar. 10, 1994) (on file with author).
58. Id.
59. 256 S.E.2d 879, 880-81, Syl. Pt. 5 (W. Va. 1979).
60. Id.at 880.

61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 880-81.
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decisions.' Third, overruled common law decisions "may result in the
overruling decision being given retroactive effect, since the substantive
issue usually has a narrower impact and is likely to involve fewer parties. 6 Fourth, where an overruling decision involves substantial public policy issues arising from statutory or constitutional interpretations
that are a clear departure from previous precedent, it is less likely that
retroactivity will be extended." Fifth, radical departures from previous
substantive decisions will likely not be extended retroactivity.67 Finally, the court considers what courts in other jurisdictions have decided about retroactive/prospective applications in the same area of law as
the overruled decision.' The Holmes court would choose not to make
its holding retroactive.
C. The Speech or Debate Clause
In addition to the question of the constitutionality of the pay raise,
Relators Holmes and Kopp alleged that the court allowed discovery by
the Intervenors in "blatant violation of the [West Virginia] Rules of
Appellate Procedure and the separation of powers doctrine set forth in
the West Virginia Constitution."69 The Relators alleged that no genuine material issues of fact were raised by the Intervenors which required discovery, yet the court permitted this discovery.7" The Speech
or Debate Clause of the West Virginia Constitution states that:
Members of the legislature shall, in all cases except treason, felony and
breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during the session, and for
ten days before and after the same; and for words spoken in debate, or
any report, motion or proposition made in either house, a member shall
not be questioned in any other place."

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Bradley, 256 S.E.2d at 880-81, Syl. Pt. 5.
Id. at 881, Syl. Pt. 5.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Supplemental Memorandum of Law, supra note 27, at 18.
Id. at 19-20.
W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 17 (emphasis added).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol97/iss3/14

12

Clark: State Ex Rel. Holmes v. Gainer: The Legislative Pay Raise and the

1995]

THE LEGISLATIVE PAY RAISE

The federal constitution contains an analogous provision which states
that "for any Speech or Debate in either House, [the Senators and
Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other Place."2 The
Holmes court refused to acknowledge any of the issues raised by the
Relators concerning violations of the Clause as a result of the court
allowing the Intervenors to depose legislators, the clerks of the respective houses of the state legislature, and members of the Commission.
Very little has been written concerning the interpretation of the
West Virginia Speech or Debate Clause. However, the analogous federal provision has been analyzed in several instances. The United States
Supreme Court has stated that the purpose of the Clause is to protect
legislators "not only from the consequences of litigation's results but
also from the burden of defending themselves."" The Court has interpreted the Clause as going beyond its literal language and has held that
the Clause protects members from inquiry into the "deliberative and
communicative processes" that are an integral part of legislative proceedings with respect to the consideration of legislation. 4 In United
States v. Johnson," the Supreme Court stated that the Speech or Debate Clause functioned to protect the integrity of the legislative branch
by allowing legislators to engage in their legislative function without
fear of inquiry by the coordinate branches of the government. However, the actions of congressmen which fall outside legislative activities
are not protected by the Clause as the Clause is to be construed as
only protecting the integrity of the legislative process. 6 For example,
a legislator's newsletter to constituents would not be subject to the protection of the Clause.77
One of the foremost cases interpreting the federal Speech or Debate Clause is Tenney v. Brandhove.78 In this case, the Court stated
that the "privilege of legislators to be free . . . from civil process" for
72. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6 (emphasis added).
73. Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82, 85 (1967).
74. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 625 (1972).

75. 383 U.S. 169, 178 (1966).
76. See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 133 (1979).
77. Id. (commonly known as an exercise of the franking privilege).
78. 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
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what they do or say in the legislative process has its origin in the
struggles between the King and Parliament in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.79 Additionally, the Court stressed its principle that a

court's interference into the legislative function is not consistent with
the separation of powers doctrine upon which the Constitution is founded." The Court expressed a concern that "[i]n times of political
passion, dishonest or vindictive motives are readily attributed to legislative conduct and as readily believed.""' The Court opined that the
courts are not -the place for such controversies. 2
However, the early 1970s marked the end of absolute legislative
immunity under the Speech or Debate Clause as courts began to inquire into legislative motive in passing legislation.83 In several areas
of constitutional interpretation, the courts have held that unconstitutional legislative motive is enough to invalidate legislation as unconstitutional. 4 Evidence of unconstitutional motive is best ascertained from
testimony and discovery from legislators.85 Thus, a constitutional collision is created as the courts' role in deciding a statute's constitutionality runs head on into the protection from inquiry specified in the
Speech or Debate Clause.86 Professor Louis B. Raveson has hypothesized that the privilege afforded by the Speech or Debate Clause is
only a qualified one.' Thus, Professor Raveson argues that the jurisprudence surrounding this conflict between judicial inquiry and legislative independence suggests that "members of Congress should not be
compelled to testify or submit to discovery unless doing so is demon79. Id. at 372.
80. Id. at 377.
81. Id. at 378.
82. Id.
83. Louis S. Raveson, Uninasking the Motives of Government Decisionmakers:A Subpoena for Your Thoughts?, 63 N.C. L. REV. 879, 880 (1985).

84. Id. at 881, 883 n.21 (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding
that the plaintiff in an equal protection challenge bore the burden that challenged discriminatory conduct was undertaken with a racially discriminatory purpose; Keyes v. School Dist.

No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973) (holding that a showing of improper legislative motive constituted a prima facie case to establish an equal protection violation in regard to de jure
school segregation)).

85. Raveson, supra note 83, at 881.
86. Id. at 881-82.
87. Id. at 882.
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strably critical for the court to discharge its obligation."88 As this
commentator submits, this conflict must be resolved on a case by case
basis.89 An intrusion into the legislative process should be warranted
only when absolutely necessary for judicial review." The Holmes
court was faced with resolving this conflict.
IV. THE DECISION
The Holmes court was faced with interpreting the confusing language of the Legislative Improvement Amendment to the West Virginia
Constitution. The majority opinion held that the language of the
Amendment precluded the Citizens Legislative Compensation Commission from recommending a legislative compensation and expense resolution in 1994 as the year was not one falling within the quadrennial
cycle.91 However, the 3-2 majority declined to make its decision retroactive and, thus, validated the passage of House Bill 4031. In contrast, the two bitter dissents took very different views of the proper
interpretation of the Legislative Improvement Amendment.93 Though
the constitutionality of the amendment was addressed, no member of
the court made any reference to the request of Relators Holmes and
Kopp that the court strike certain aspects of discovery which they
alleged to be in violation of the Speech or Debate Clause of the West
Virginia Constitution."
A.

The Majority Opinion

The majority opinion, authored by Justice Miller, garnered a total
of three votes.95 The majority concluded that although it interpreted
the language of the Legislative Improvement Amendment to find that
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id.
Id. at 888.
Raveson, supra note 83, at 892.
Holmes, 447 S.E.2d at 893.
Id. at 894.
Id. at 896-97.
See Supplemental Memorandum of Law, supra note 27, at 18-24.
Holmes, 447 S.E.2d at 889 (Miller, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, joined

by Workman, J., and McHugh, .).
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the passage of the pay raise was procedurally unconstitutional, it would
still issue the Relators' requested Writs of Mandamus and Prohibition
by applying its interpretation only prospectively. 6 In so holding, the
majority rejected the Relators' argument that the Citizens Legislative
Compensation Commission could meet as often as necessary and submit resolutions to the legislature concerning compensation and expenses
at any time.' The Relators argued that the constitutional amendment
mandated a meeting of the Commissioners every fourth year commencing from 1971, but that the Commission was free to meet more frequently to submit resolutions at any time.98 Additionally, the Relators
argued that the constitutional requirement that such a resolution be
submitted within fifteen days of the beginning of the legislative session
only applied to the mandated quadrennial meeting." The court rejected all of these interpretations of the Legislative Improvement Amendment. Instead, the court held that although the Commission may meet
as often as necessary, only every four years commencing in 1971 may
it submit a compensation and expense allowance resolution to the legislature and such resolution must be submitted within the fifteen days of
the beginning of the session."

1. The Solution to the Ambiguity of the Legislative Improvement
Amendment
The central issue in Holmes centered around the question of how
often the Citizens Legislative Compensation Commission could meet
and submit resolutions for compensation and expense allowances. The
Holmes court first addressed the contention of Intervenors Boley and
Pulliam that the Commission's resolution submitted on March 3, 1994,
was not within a year constitutionally allowed1 0' The court conceded
that a motivating factor behind the adoption of the Legislative Improvement Amendment was to "liberalize the ability to increase legisla-

96. Id. at 896.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Petitioners' Memorandum, supra note 5, at 6.
Id.
Id. at 6-7.
Holmes, 447 S.E.2d at 892-93.
Id. at 890-91.
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tive compensation and expense allowances.""2 Prior to this amendment to the state constitution, a separate constitutional amendment was
necessary each time to raise the compensation and expense allowances
of the legislature." Nonetheless, in view of past history, the court
believed that the voters who ratified the amendment did not intend for
the Commission to submit a resolution more often than every four
10 4

years.

First, the court focused on the inherent ambiguity within the
amendment. Specifically, Relators Holmes and Kopp pointed to the
phrase, "[t]he commission shall meet as often as may be necessary," to
support their contention that the pay raise bill was passed- in accord
with proper constitutional procedure.'
Conversely, Intervenors Boley
and Pulliam relied upon the remainder of the same paragraph to support their assertion that the Commission may only submit its compensation and allowance resolution quadrennially beginning in 1971.1)6
Therein lay the ambiguity.
Second, the court considered the Intervenors' additional contention
that a resolution, pursuant to the amendment, must be submitted within
fifteen days of the beginning of the legislative session, a requirement
that was not met in this instance. 07
The majority acknowledged the position taken by two separate
state attorney generals0" that the Commission could submit compensation and expense allowance resolutions on intervals more frequently
than quadrennially." However, Justice Miller declined to agree with
the opinions of the attorney generals, finding instead that the attorney
generals did not adequately consider the historical background sur-

102. Id. at 891.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 893.
105. Holmes, 447 S.E.2d at 891 (quoting W. VA. CONST. art VI, § 33).
106. Id. See supra note 50.
107. Holmes, 447 S.E.2d at 894-95 (House Bill 4031 was submitted to the Legislature
by the Citizens Legislative Compensation Commission on the fifty-eighth day of the 1994
legislative session).
108. See supra notes 53, 54, and 57.
109. Holmes, 447 S.E.2d at 891-92.
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rounding the adoption of the Legislative Improvement Amendment.'
In so finding, Justice Miller foreshadowed the court's ultimate ruling
that resolutions could be submitted only every fourth year.
However, the court recognized that its 'holding that resolutions
could be submitted only every fourth year must be reconciled with the
amendment's language which clearly stated that the Commission could
meet as often as necessary."' To resolve the ambiguity, the court relied on its rule that "[q]uestions of constitutional construction are in
the main governed by the same general rules applied in statutory construction.""' The court believed that the attorney generals' interpretations of the section, that the Commission could submit resolutions
whenever it felt necessary, would "emasculate" the language of the
provision which set up the quadrennial cycle for pay raises."' Therefore, it was necessary for the court to look
at the "statute as a whole"
4
effect."
intended
its
to give the provision
The court held that the amendment only intended to give the Commission latitude in determining the frequency of its meetings; yet, the
amendment intended to restrict the Commission's submission of its
resolutions only on a quadrennial basis beginning with the 1971 legislative session." 5 This holding, reasoned the majority, gave meaning to
the amendment as a whole and comported with the historical background of the amendment." 6

110. Id. at 892.

111. Id. (the court noted that the provision contained no mandatory language that the
Citizens Legislative Compensation Commission's resolution can be submitted only on a quadrennial
112.
(W. Va.
113.
114.

basis).
Id. (quoting Winkler v. State Sch. Bldg. Auth., 434 S.E.2d 420, 422, Syl. Pt. 1
1993)).
Id.
Holmes, 447 S.E.2d at 892 (quoting State ex rel. Fetters v. Hott, 318 S.E.2d 446,

447, Syl. Pt. 3 (W. Va. 1984); Smith v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 219
S.E.2d 361, 362, Syl. Pt. 2 (W. Va. 1975)).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 892-93 (the court explained that it believed that although the Legislative
Improvement Amendment was designed to loosen the restrictive requirements which mandated a citizen vote on legislative pay increases, the amendment was not intended to allow the
Commission to submit compensation and expense allowance resolutions any more often than

four years).
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The court's holding to resolve the ambiguity of the Legislative
Improvement Amendment was very simple. First, the Commission may
meet as often as necessary." 7 Second, only on a quadrennial basis
may it submit its compensation and expense allowances to the legislature, beginning in 1971."s Finally, the legislature is free to act on the
Commission's resolution at any time during the four year cycle before
another resolution is constitutionally required of the Commission."1 9
2. The Rejection of Retroactive Application
Though the court held that the submission of the compensation and
expense allowance resolution to the legislature in 1994 was unconstitutional, it refused to extend retroactive application of its rule and invalidate the pay raise bill. The court noted that no previous interpretation
of the Legislative Improvement Amendment to the West Virginia Constitution had been rendered and that two separate attorneys had given
interpretations of the amendment which would "justify the actions taken by the Commission and [l]egislature."' 20
The decision to apply this holding only prospectively was grounded in the general principles of retroactivity announced by the court in
Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co.' Additionally, the majority analogized the Holmes decision to a similar decision made in Winkler v.
State School Building Authority.l " In Winkler, the court held that an
issuance of school bonds was unconstitutional because it violated the
debt restriction provisions of the state constitution," but gave this
decision only prospective application and refused to invalidate bonds
which were issued prior to the Winkler opinion. 24 The Holmes court

117. Id. at 893.
118. Id.
119. Holmes, 447 S.E.2d at 893.
120. Id.
121. 256 S.E.2d 879, 880-81, Syl. Pt. 5 (W. Va. 1979). The principles of Bradley are
more fully discussed supra Part II.
122. 447 S.E.2d at 894 (citing Winkler v. State Sch. Bldg. Auth., 434 S.E.2d 420 (W.
Va. 1993)).
123. W. VA. CONST. art. X, § 4.
124. 434 $.E.2d at 420, 423, Syl. Pt. 9.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1995

19

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 97, Iss. 3 [1995], Art. 14

WEST VIRGI

LAWREVIEW

[V/ol. 97:853

explained that prospective application would be implemented only in
cases where "'substantial public issues are involved, arising from statutory or constitutional interpretations that represent a clear departure
from prior precedent.""' Although no interpretation of the Legislative Improvement Amendment had been given by a court, the Holmes
court placed great emphasis on the two attorney generals' positions
which opined that the actions of the Commission and legislature were
constitutional.126 The court justified its prospective operation by holding that the questions of this case were substantial public policy issues
of the type discussed in Bradley, as they involved the constitutional
procedures for obtaining legislative pay and expense allowance increases in which state taxpayers maintain a vital interest. 27
3. The Interpretation of the Fifteen Day Period
The court next addressed the subsidiary contention of Intervenors
Boley and Pulliam that the pay raise bill was unconstitutional because
of the Commission's failure to submit its resolution within fifteen days
of the beginning of the legislative session. The court stated that the
delay in submission of the resolution was due to the Governor's failure
to fill four vacancies on the seven member Commission until early
February of 1994.1' It reasoned that the Governor's failure to appoint persons to fill these vacancies until after the fifteen day period
had elapsed made it impossible for the Commission to comply with the
letter of the constitution.'29
The court expressed concern that an executive could paralyze the
operation of an administrative agency by refusing to appoint persons to
such an agency.' Such an action by a governor and a judicial validation of the same could "destroy the reasonable expectations of the
parties who are beneficiaries of [the agency's] jurisdiction."'' As au125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

447 S.E.2d at 894 (quoting Bradley, 256 S.E.2d at 880-81, Syl. Pt. 5).
Id. at 894. See also supra notes 53, 54, and 57.
Holmes, 447 S.E.2d at 894.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 894.
Id. at 895.
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thority, the Holmes court referred to two cases where the Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia upheld an agency's decision despite
the Governor's failure to appoint to an administrative tribunal the full
complement of members.'
Therefore, the majority reasoned that
Governor Caperton's delay in appointing members to the Citizens Legislative Compensation Commission until after the fifteen day period
had elapsed did not invalidate the Commission's compensation and expense resolution.'33
4. The Rejection of the Due Process Challenge
Intervenors Boley and Pulliam additionally challenged the constitutionality of the compensation and expense allowance resolution on due
process grounds, alleging that the decision to submit the resolution to
the legislature was not done in an independent manner consistent with
the purpose of the Legislative Improvement Amendment to "remove
the Legislature from the initial decision-making process relative to
legislative compensation and expenses."' 34 This challenge was based
on allegations that certain members of the legislature had contacts with
members of the Citizens Legislative Compensation Commission concerning the amount of pay raise that the Commission should recommend. "35
' The court noted a lack of precedent cited by the Intervenors
to support the due process challenge in their brief, though the Intervenors did cite two cases in oral argument as authority.'36 Instead, the

132. Holmes, 447 S.E.2d at 894-95 (citing Francis 0. Day Co. v. West Virginia Reclamation Bd. of Review, 424 S.E.2d 763 (W. Va. 1992) (the Board must enter an order allowing an appeal of a decision to the next higher tribunal when there were not enough
members to take action on an administrative appeal which statutorily required four votes

rather than delay further an administrative decision); Serian v. State by and through West
Virginia Bd. of Optometry, 297 S.E.2d 889 (W. Va. 1982) (holding that the Governor's failure to appoint a lay member to the Board of Optometry. did not deprive the Board of its
jurisdiction to hear a license revocation case)).
133. Id. at 895.
134. Brief of the Intervenors, supra note 38, at 19.
135. Holmes, 447 S.E.2d at 895.
136. Id. at 895-96. The Holmes court noted that in their oral argument, the Intervenors
cited Portland Audobon Soc'y v. Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534 (9th Cir.
1993), and Home Box Office, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C.
Cir. 1977). However, the Holmes court declined to recognize precedential authority in either

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1995

21

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 97, Iss. 3 [1995], Art. 14

WEST V IGINIA LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 97:853

Holmes court relied on Sierra Club v. Costle,3 7 a case that involved

ex parte communications in informal rulemaking procedures of the
federal Environmental Protection Agency, for the proposition that there
is no "judicial prohibition fashioned under a due process rubric on ex
parte communications to informal administrative proceedings."' 38 The
Holmes court viewed the Commission as a "limited administrative
agency empowered to act on the very narrow issue of legislative compensation and expense allowances."' 39 Thus, the Holmes court dismissed the Intervenors' due process challenge due to a lack of authority to support the Intervenors' proposition that ex parte communications
between legislators and the Commission, a limited administrative agency, were either improper or unconstitutional.
B. The Dissenting Opinions

Chief Justice Brotherton and Justice Neely both filed dissenting
opinions in this case. However, the two dissenting opinions differed on
both legal and philosophical grounds. The Chief Justice opined that the
majority had validated an unconstitutional legislative usurpation of the
power delegated to the citizens of West Virginia by the provisions of
the Legislative Improvement Amendment to the West Virginia Constitution. 40 Alternatively, Justice Neely dissented on the ground that the
procedures employed by both the Commission and the legislature were
in accord with the spirit and letter of the West Virginia Constitution

case. PortlandAudobon Soc'y dealt only with the prohibition of ex parte communications
under the federal Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 557(d)(1), (2) (1976), which is
not controlling on decisions of state law. The West Virginia Administrative Procedures Act,
W. VA. CODE §§ 29A-1-1 to 29A-7-4 (1993 & Supp. 1994), does not contain a similar
prohibition. The court also declined to use Home Box Office due to the same circuit court's
contrary opinion in Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 402 (D.C. Cir. 1981), which held
that the principles of Home Box Office were not applicable to informal rulemaking of the
general policymaking sort.
137. 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
138. Holmes, 447 S.E.2d at 896.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 897-901 (Brotherton, CJ., dissenting).
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and hypothesized that this case was grounded in the public's "loathing
41
of all politicians."'
1. Chief Justice Brotherton's Analysis
Chief Justice Brotherton compared the majority's decision with the
magic of illusionist David Copperfield. 14 2 According to the Chief Justice, the majority made the "[c]onstitution disappear in 1994 and reappear in 1995.'1 4' This dissenting opinion agreed with the majority's
resolution of the language of the Legislative Improvement Amendment
but took issue with every other facet of the majority's analysis.4
As to the retroactive application, the Chief Justice strongly disagreed with the majority's refusal to make its interpretation of the
constitutional amendment retroactive. Chief Justice Brotherton criticized
the majority for using the attorney generals' opinions collectively as a
"crutch" to support the majority's decision not to extend the holding
retroactively, thereby validating the unconstitutional actions. 45 According to the Chief Justice: "I have never known this [c]ourt to use
the opinion of an Attorney General as a crutch to declare an act of the
[l]egislature valid."' 45 Moreover, he pointed out that applying the
principles of retroactivity was unnecessary in this case because the
Commission could meet constitutionally and submit a compensation and
expense allowance resolution in January of 1995 in accordance with
the majority's holding. 4
As to the fifteen day period, this dissent disputed the majority's
characterization of the Commission as a theoretical administrative agency. 48 Chief Justice Brotherton asserted that the majority's concern regarding a governor's ability to paralyze a governmental agency by de-

141. Id. at 896 (Neely, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 898 (Brotherton, CJ., dissenting).
143. Holmes, 447 S.E.2d at 898.

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 898.
Id. at 899.
Holmes, 447 S.E.2d at 898.
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laying appointment of its members was unfounded.1 49 Quite simply,
his dissent declared that the meeting of the constitutionally created
Commission and its resulting resolutions had no effect on the general
operation of the government's legislative function. 5 ' Therefore, Chief
Justice Brotherton would mandate the submission of resolutions within
the fifteen day period from the beginning of the legislative session in
any quadrennial year.
Chief Justice Brotherton's central dispute with the majority involved the due process challenge to the enactment of House Bill
4031.15 The Chief Justice characterized the passage of the bill as a
"deprivation of the citizens' rights through the abuse of legislative
power." ' He emphasized the history of the Legislative Improvement
Amendment, which created the Citizens Legislative Compensation
Commission and delegated the duty of deciding legislative compensation and expense allowances to the Commission. 13 Given this history,
the Chief Justice nonetheless concluded that the citizens "did not relin' Therefore, he contended that the intent of
quish this power lightly."154
the amendment was that the legislature should have no control over the
determination of their own salaries. 55 This intent was frustrated by
the passage of House Bill 4031.1 56 Specifically, Chief Justice
Brotherton alleged that the Governor and the legislature engaged in a
quid pro quo transaction in which Governor Caperton appointed members to the Commission upon the request of the legislature in exchange
for assistance in getting the Governor's stalled legislative program
through the legislature.1 57 As evidence, the Chief Justice alluded to:
(1) a letter written by the President of the Senate asking Attorney
General McGraw for an opinion as to when the Commission could
constitutionally meet; (2) communications by legislators with the pro-

149. Id. at 898-99 (citations omitted).
150. Id. at 899.
151. Id. at 899-900.
152. Id.
153. Holmes, 447 S.E.2d at 899.

154.
155.
156.
157.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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posed Commission Chairman, prior to the Governor's appointment of
the Commission Chairman, about the proposed Chairman's feelings
regarding a legislative pay raise; and (3) an agreement made between
the proposed Commission Chairman and legislators concerning the
handling of future legislative travel expenses. 58
As a result of this mischief, this dissent declared it was "no surprise" that a very intricately detailed, typed resolution with fill-in
blanks for amounts was sent to Commission members for the sole
Commission meeting held prior to the resolution's submission."'s No
record was made of any Commission discussion concerning the resolution or of the Commission Chairman's contacts with legislators concerning the resolution.16 Thus, the Chief Justice concluded that the
theoretically independent Citizens Legislative Compensation Commission became "an arm of the [legislature and turned its back on the
citizens," the very individuals the Commission was created to represent."' He asserted that a fundamentally unfair process wrought with
ex parte communications between legislators and Commission members,
coupled with the Commission's submission to legislative pressure,
served only to weaken government by creating mistrust by the citizenry-" In sum, Chief Justice Brotherton concluded that the only due
process received in this instance was by the legislators. 63
2. Justice Neely's Alternative Analysis
Justice Neely dissented to the majority's holding that the provisions of the Legislative Improvement Amendment allow the Citizens
Legislative Compensation Commission to submit its resolutions only on
a quadrennial basis." According to Justice Neely, "[t]he plain words
[of the amendment] allows [sic] the [C]ommission to meet as often as

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Holmes, 447 S.E.2d at 899-900.
Id. at 900.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Holmes, 447 S.E.2d at 900.
Id. at 896 (Neely, J., dissenting).
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it wishes, but it must submit a resolution every four years."165 Justice
Neely objected to the majority's characterization of the language of the
amendment as contradictory or ambiguous." He asserted that the majority interpreted the amendment in its own "view" and "belief," which
should have nothing to do with constitutional interpretation, rather than
giving the amendment its plain meaning.167
Justice Neely saw this case as one originating from the public's
"loathing of all politicians in general and a peculiar distaste for legislators in particular."'"
Contrary to the tone of Chief Justice
Brotherton, Justice Neely viewed the legislators as the "heros and not
the villains of the democratic process." 69 This distaste for legislators
is the reason why "it was thought necessary to require the Commission
to meet at least every four years" and issue a report on compensation
and expense allowances.17

Nothing prevents the Commission from

meeting more frequently and submitting resolutions more often."'
Thus, Justice Neely concluded that the pay raise effected by the Citizens Legislative Compensation Commission and legislature was not
only constitutional but also well deserved.'
V. ANALYSIS

A.

The Court Properly Interpreted the Legislative Improvement
Amendment to the West Virginia Constitution

The inherent ambiguity in the language of the Legislative Improvement Amendment is obvious. The confusion stems from the lan-

guage which states that "[t]he [Citizens Legislative Compensation
C]ommission shall meet as often as may be necessary" contrasted with
the language that states that the Commission "shall within fifteen days

165. Id.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id.
Id.
Holmes, 447 S.E.2d at 896.
Id.
Id. at 897.
Id.
Id.
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after the beginning of the
session of the legislature in the year
[1971]... [and] in each fourth year thereafter submit by resolution .. its determination of compensation and expense allowances. .... "'" The amendment gives the Commission great latitude to
meet whenever it deems necessary. However, the additional language
implies a restriction on the Commission's ability to submit its recommendations as to compensation and expense allowances.
The majority's holding resolved the contradictory language in a
well-reasoned manner. Prior to the enactment of the Legislative Improvement Amendment in 1970, a separate constitutional amendment
was required each time to raise legislative salaries. 174 Though the
Holmes court admitted that the amendment's purpose was to "liberalize
the ability to increase legislative compensation and expense allowances,",175 the majority resisted the interpretation of the amendment which
would allow the Commission to submit its resolutions whenever it saw
fit. In fact, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia stated in a
prior decision that the Citizens Legislative Compensation Commission
"was authorized to recommend to the [legislature at four year intervals
the maximum compensation to be paid to legislators." '7 6
The majority's interpretation of the ambiguous language gave
meaning to all parts of the amendment. In other cases, the court has
said that it will apply the rules of statutory construction to resolve
questions of constitutional ambiguity."7 To ascertain legislative intent,
the court has looked at statutes wholly to give each part of the statute
meaning and accomplish the general purpose of the legislation.178 In
accordance with these rules of statutory construction, the Holmes

173. W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 33.
174. Holmes, 447 S.E.2d at 890-91.

175. Id. at 891.
176.

Campbell v. Kelly, 202 S.E.2d 369, 372 (W. Va. 1974). Interestingly, the Holmes

court failed to make any mention of the Campbell case in its decision. Moreover, Justice
Neely, in authoring the majority opinion in Campbell, which recognized the four-year limit

on resolution submissions, apparently contradicted his own dissent in Holmes.
177. See, e.g., Winkler v. State Sch. Bldg. Auth., 434 S.E.2d 420, 422, Syl. Pt. 1 (W.

Va. 1993).
178.

Jeffrey v. Jeffrey, 425 S.E.2d 152, 153, Syl. Pt. 3 (W. Va. 1992).
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court's holding takes into account both parts of the constitutional
amendment and allows both parts to have meaning.
Additionally, as the majority emphasized, the history surrounding
the ratification of the Legislative Improvement Amendment did not
lend itself to the conclusion that the Citizens Legislative Compensation
Commission may submit its resolutions more often than quadrennially.
The Citizens' Advisory Commission, a group that advocated the passage of the 1970 amendment, issued a release, subsequent to the passage of the proposed amendment by the 1970 legislature and prior to
the placing of the amendment on the November 1970 ballot, entitled
Five Minute Talk Explaining the "Legislative Improvement
Amendment."1 9 This release argued for the passage of the amendment
by stating that "[t]his Commission . . . will submit to the [llegislature
every four years its determination of compensation and expense allowances for members of the [l]egislature."' 80 The release indicated to
the 1970 voters that such resolutions would be submitted only on a
quadrennial basis. Thus, it can be easily surmised that the voters intended that a resolution be submitted no more frequently than on a
quadrennial basis. The majority's holding gives the deserved weight to
that intent while creating an understandable standard for the legislature
and the Citizens Legislative Compensation Commission to follow in
enacting any future compensation and expense allowance increases.
B. The Court Improperly Applied the Bradley Retroactivity Standard
The Holmes court misapplied the standards of retroactivity of overruling decisions set forth in Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co.' In
Bradley, the factors for determining whether retroactivity will be extended were espoused in the context of an overruling decision. In that
case, the Bradley court overturned the tort standard of contributory
negligence in favor of a standard of comparative negligence and made

179. Brief of the Intervenors, supra note 38, at 16.
180. Id. (quoting CrzENs' ADvIsoRY COMM'N, FvE MInUtE TALK ExPLANnG TBE
'".GISLATIVE

181.

IPRovEMEN,

AMEmMmN

2 (1970)).

256 $.E.2d 879, 880-81, Syl. Pt. 5 (W. Va. 1979).
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the decision retroactive to all pending cases." 2 In giving retroactive
effect to its decision, the Bradley court recognized that the contributory
negligence standard was a judicially created doctrine.'83 In the present
case, the issue did not revolve around a judicially created doctrine, but
more importantly, it revolved around a constitutional provision which
the court concluded had been violated.
It is useful to break down the Bradley formulation in the context
of the Holmes case. The Bradley factors are contingent on an overruling decision. For example, the first Bradley factor states that the nature
of the substantive issue overruled is relevant.'84 In the Holmes case,
no issue, substantive or otherwise, was overruled. To the contrary, the
Holmes case presented the first occasion in which the court had the
opportunity to interpret this important constitutional issue. The entire
Bradley formulation provides a standard for overruling decisions of
previous substantive or procedural issues. The Holmes court did not
issue an opinion which effectively overruled any issue. Thus, the
Bradley standard was inapplicable in the Holmes decision and was
erroneously utilized.
The Holmes decision did not overturn any established precedent. It
can be argued that the decision did overrule the opinions offered by
the attorney generals concerning the interpretation of the Legislative
Improvement Amendment. However, the Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia previously has made clear that such opinions are not
binding and do not carry precedential weight. 8 ' Therefore, it is disingenuous to argue in the wake of Wassick that the Holmes opinion
overruled anything precedential.
The majority further justified its decision to eschew retroactivity
by citing the recent case of Winkler v. State School Building Authority' 86 In Winkler, the court refused to make retroactive its holding
that the School Building Authority's issuance of revenue bonds was

182. Id. at 890.
183. Id. at 881.

184. Id. at 889.
185. See State v. Wassick, 191 S.E.2d 283, 287 (W. Va. 1972).
186. 434 S.E.2d 420 (W. Va. 1993).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1995

29

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 97, Iss. 3 [1995], Art. 14

WEST VIRGNIA LAWREV!EW

[Vol. 97:853

violative of the state constitution's debt restriction provisions.1 However, the bonds in Winkler had already been issued to bondholders."'
The invalidation of these issued bonds would have drastically impacted
the state of West Virginia's credit rating and negatively impacted the
citizens of West Virginia." 9 At the time of the Holmes decision, 1"
not one dollar of taxpayer money had been spent to finance the cost of
the legislative pay raise. The raise was not scheduled to go into effect
until the 1995 legislative session. West Virginia's credit rating or credibility among its citizens would not have been negatively impacted by
the retroactive application of the Holmes decision. These justifications
of Winkler were not present in the Holmes case for the court's refusal
of retroactive application. The practical nightmares of retroactivity
inherent in Winkler were simply not present in Holmes. In fact, it
could be argued that the credibility of the state government would be
bolstered by an extension of retroactivity in this case. For these reasons, the majority's reliance on Winkler was misplaced.
C. The Court Disregarded the Speech or Debate Clause of the
Federal and State Constitutions by Allowing Legislators to be
Deposed
The most disturbing aspect of Holmes was the court's granting of
the request of Intervenors Boley and Pulliam to depose certain members of the West Virginia Legislature as well as members of the Citizens Legislative Compensation Commission"' and its subsequent silent denial of the request by Relators Holmes and Kopp that this discovery be stricken. The Speech or Debate Clauses of both the federal
and state constitutions are explicit in prohibiting examination of legislators regarding matters upon which those legislators communicate and

187. Id. at 436 (reviewing W. VA. CoNsT. art. X, §4).
188. Id. at 423.
189. Id. at 435.

190. Holmes, 447 $.E.2d at 887.
191. The court entered an Order on April 22, 1994, granting this request, as well as a
request to issue a subpoena duces tecum upon Governor Gaston Caperton's office to obtain
records of any meetings between the Governor and Senators William K. Wooton and Wil-

liam 1K Sharp.
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deliberate while the legislature is in session. 1" However, the absolute
protection from examination apparently granted by the federal clause
has been eroded somewhat by decisions of the United States Supreme
Court.'93 Due to the dearth of precedent construing the state clause,
the United States Supreme Court precedents concerning the federal
clause facilitate an understanding of the theory and operation of the
state clause.
In the federal system, a case-by-case, ad hoc jurisprudence has
evolved in determining whether or not inquiry will be permitted into
the legislative process by the courts.' Therefore, though a privilege
does exist under the Speech or Debate Clause, the privilege is not an
absolute one but instead a qualified one.' 9" The necessity of a court's
intrusion into the legislative province must be balanced with the equally important necessity of legislative freedom and independence.' 96 In
Holmes, the court failed to apply this balancing test, opting instead to
invade the legislative province without consideration of, or concern for,
legislative freedom and the separation of powers. Application of this
balancing rationale would have resulted in the court's denial of the
Intervenors' request to depose legislators or alternatively, the court's
striking of this discovery.
The deposition of members of the legislature and members of the
Citizens Legislative Compensation Commission was not necessary to
the resolution of this case. The Holmes court based its holding of unconstitutionality solely upon its interpretation of the Legislative Improvement Amendment."9 The court addressed the Intervenors' claims
of due process violations by noting that the Intervenors had cited no
rule of law in their brief to support the contention that any contact between legislators and members of the Citizens Legislative Compensation Commission was illegal in any manner.'98 Though acknowledging
in its opinion that the Intervenors failed to cite any law until oral
192. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6; W. Va. Const. art. VI, § 17.
193. See discussion supra Part EII.C.

194. See generally Raveson, supra-note 83, at 882.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Holmes, 447 S.E.2d at 890-94.

198. Id. at 895.
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argument which supported the contention that the citizens of West
Virginia were denied due process, and rejecting the Intervenors' basis
for this contention, the court nevertheless failed to exercise its prerogative to strike -the Intervenors' discovery. Such discovery intruded into
the legislative province by questioning legislators as to their communicative and deliberative processes concerning the passage of the legislative pay raise.
No necessity existed for the court to inquire into the legislative
process. The court based its holding on other factors independent of
the Intervenors' due process argument. This intrusion upon legislative
freedom and independence was not vital or important to the court's
decision in this case and was unwarranted. The balancing of interests
between legislative freedom and judicial inquiry was never performed
by the court. The court's order granting the Intervenors' motion for
discovery on April 22, 1994, and subsequent silent refusal to strike this
discovery in its opinion of July 20, 1994, were poorly considered exercises of raw judicial power. The privilege of legislators from having to
explain their actions to the judiciary provided by the state and federal
Speech or Debate Clauses was effectively written out of the constitution in this case sub silentio. Not one member of the Holmes court
addressed this issue. The court's silence set a dangerous precedent of
exhibiting a lack of respect for the concept of separation of powers
among the three co-equal branches of government in this State.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Upon a preliminary glance, the holding of State ex rel. Holmes v.
Gainer appears to be frustrating only to the citizens of West Virginia.
The court's holding of the unconstitutionality of the pay raise diluted
by its declination of retroactivity frustrated the intent of the Legislative
Improvement Amendment and disgusted voters around the state.'99
The court's analysis of the historical background concerning the
amendment was well-reasoned and appropriately decided. The court

199. A review of election results from the November, 1994, general election reflects
some distaste among state voters toward those members of the legislature who voted in
favor of the pay raise.
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easily could have invalidated the pay raise but instead erroneously
chose to employ the standards of retroactivity to validate an unconstitutional legislative act.
The most disturbing aspect of this case was the court's total disregard for legislative independence. The court offered no rationale for its
granting of discovery into the legislative process and its subsequent
refusal to strike this discovery as violative of the Speech or Debate
Clause and of the tripartite system of distribution of governmental
power. Though several federal decisions have held that it is permissible
to inquire into the legislative process when necessary for a court to decide an important issue, no such necessity existed in this case. The
implications of the court's actions in this case are expansive in scope.
Any controversial act passed by the legislature could subject legislators
to interrogation regarding the passage in light of the due process argument of the Intervenors in this case. This failure to balance legislative
interests with judicial inquiry resulted in the judiciary becoming the
preeminent branch of government in this circumstance. The legislature
was compelled by subpoena to answer questions concerning activities
which are constitutionally privileged under the state and federal constitutions. If the privilege was so easily disregarded by the Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia in the Holmes case, it is doubtful
that it will be given much more serious consideration in the future.
Matthew L. Clark
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